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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Late afternoon view of the CBD with building construction and office skyscrapers along Jalan Jend Sudirman, Jakarta © Martin 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With a population of around 250 million, Indonesia is the world’s third-largest developing country. What’s less 
well-known is that Indonesia is the de facto leader of ASEAN, a key regional grouping with a population of over 
600 million people and a combined GDP (2012 PPP estimates) approaching that of India and Japan. Therefore, 
Indonesia’s prospects to 2020 and beyond should be a central consideration for international policymakers 
considering likely trends in Asia during the decade ahead.
This survey looks at the possible paths for policy and development in Indonesia under the leadership of the seventh 
president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, who will take office in Jakarta on 20 October. The first part of the survey is a 
stocktake of the challenges that lie ahead after 10 years of largely peaceful and progressive administration under 
the leadership of Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). The stocktake assesses the state 
of play in five areas: the political system; economic challenges; government and administration; social issues; and 
foreign affairs.
Then two possible scenarios of governance under the new administration are considered:
• An outward-looking reform path would be likely to be harder to implement in the short term but promises 
significant gains in the medium term.
• An inward-looking resilience path would perhaps be a more popular option with some powerful groups in 
Indonesia but would delay many urgently needed reforms.
President Joko Widodo will face a range of early challenges. He’ll need to build good political support for his 
programs within Indonesia to be able to follow a reform path. And the economic challenges he faces are formidable. 
He has promised to try to reduce Indonesia’s large energy subsidies, which are limiting fiscal policy, but that won’t 
be easy. He has also identified the need to encourage investment, boost support for infrastructure development, 
and implement poverty-alleviation programs. Reform of government and administration will also be needed under 
a reform path. Widodo has often expressed his personal frustration with the delays and inefficiencies of the public 
sector in Indonesia. As president, the buck stops with him. It’s now up to him to implement public sector reform.
In the area of foreign policy, he’ll have little time to review issues before three major international meetings appear 
on his agenda. Within three weeks of his appointment, there’ll be meetings of APEC in Beijing, East Asia Summit in 
Naypyitaw and the G20 in Brisbane. At those meetings, both he and the policies of the new government will come 
under close attention. The international community will have an opportunity to gain an early first-hand impression 
of the style of the new president and of the prospects for Indonesian economic policy under the new administration. 
Outward-looking statements in two areas would send a clear positive signal: a statement encouraging stronger 
economic growth by promoting investment and structural reform (not protectionism), and a statement in support of 
the growing role of ASEAN in regional cooperation programs.
But there’s no guarantee that it will be easy for Widodo to implement reforms. He may find that there are 
considerable pressures on him to adopt a more inward-looking resilience scenario. Indeed, the new president might 
not find it easy to govern.
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Widodo’s position is difficult because, although he won the presidential election in July, the oppositionist 
pro-Prabowo Subianto grouping in the parliament appears to have a clear majority of seats after the legislative 
elections in April. Widodo may need to draw on all of his considerable political and negotiating skills to work with a 
parliament in which the majority bloc of votes is so unsympathetic to the administration.
The new president may also find it difficult to adopt economic policies promoting outwardly oriented economic 
growth. Recently, the overall rate of economic growth in Indonesia has been slowing. The Indonesian economy 
needs to grow at 6% or more per year to generate enough jobs to absorb new entrants to the labour force. But the 
current growth rate is trending downwards, at close to 5% per year. Somehow, Widodo needs to find ways to boost 
growth across the economy.
President Joko Widodo may also find that it’s not easy to promote reform within government. Recent experience in 
Indonesia isn’t encouraging. Proposed reforms set out in a law introduced by the SBY administration proved difficult 
to implement. Similarly, the incoming president has raised expectations among civil society groups. There are now 
wide expectations among activist groups that supported him that he will pursue ‘pro-people welfare’ programs. But 
the cost of implementing those programs is considerable, and the national budget is strictly limited.
In contrast to a reform-oriented foreign policy, a nationalist policy focused on domestic resilience could be 
less accommodating and more cautious about participating in ambitious international or regional plans. Many 
Indonesians would support an approach of this kind, maintaining that Indonesia can only hope to provide 
leadership across the region once the country has strong institutions and a strong economy.
At the end of a largely peaceful and progressive 10 years of administration under SBY, Indonesia’s institutions have 
grown stronger, and its international standing has risen. The country’s seventh president, Joko Widodo, will now 
need to decide whether to adopt an outward-looking reform program or to pursue a more inward-looking approach 
intended to promote resilience at home. Perhaps, depending on circumstances, he’ll select policies that combine 
elements from both the reform and the resilience paths.
Introduction
Indonesia, with a population of around 250 million, is the world’s third-largest developing country. What’s less 
well known is that Indonesia is the de facto leader of ASEAN, a key regional grouping with a population of over 
600 million and a combined GDP (2012 PPP estimates) approaching that of India and Japan. Therefore, Indonesia’s 
prospects to 2020 and beyond should be a central consideration for international policymakers considering likely 
trends in Asia during the decade ahead. But, for various reasons, international discussions about the rise of Asia 
and about the prospects for the ‘Asian century’ tend to slip quickly over both Indonesia and ASEAN. While it’s 
understandable that the dramatic rise of the Chinese dragon and the Indian tiger have captured global imagination, 
closer attention to the emerging role of both Indonesia and ASEAN regionalism is needed as well.
This survey considers the possible paths for policy and development in Indonesia under the leadership of a new 
government. The first part of the survey is a stocktake of the challenges that lie ahead after 10 years of largely 
peaceful and progressive administration under the leadership of Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono. Then two possible scenarios of governance under the new administration of Joko Widodo are 
considered. An outward-looking reform path would be likely to be harder to implement in the short term but 
promises significant gains in the medium term. An inward-looking resilience path would perhaps be a more popular 
option with some powerful groups in Indonesia but would delay many of the reforms still urgently needed.
Indonesia on the brink of change
In 2014, Indonesia is on the brink of change. In October, a new president, Joko Widodo (known by the nickname 
Jokowi), will be sworn into office. He’s expected to hold office for five years until 2019 and perhaps serve a second 
term to 2024. The change of the presidency and administration is expected to bring about important changes across 
the country. It’s clear from the recent history of Indonesia that the president’s leadership matters. The leadership 
styles of the six presidents who’ve held office in Indonesia since independence was declared in 1945 have varied 
greatly. And so have many policies of the government, both at home and abroad.
The first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, was a flamboyant and charismatic leader who managed the political 
affairs of the nation with great skill for two decades after independence. But he was adventurous in foreign policy 
and challenged stability in the Southeast Asian region. He was also careless of economic policies and allowed 
Indonesian living standards to stagnate. The second president, Soeharto, governed the nation with a firm hand 
for three decades until the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. Soeharto’s style of leadership, which was cautious 
and deliberate, was very different from that of Sukarno. He supported policies that underpinned strong rates of 
economic growth but placed high emphasis on domestic stability, and he controlled political freedoms quite closely 
(see Wanandi 2012 for a vivid personal account).
CHAPTER 1
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Following the dramatic fall of Soeharto from the presidency in May 1998, three presidents held office in quick 
succession. President Habibie succeeded Soeharto for just over one year. In late 1999, the Indonesian People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) rejected Habibie’s accountability speech, so he accepted 
that he should stand down. In the election in the Consultative Assembly that followed, Abdurrahman Wahid (known 
as Gus Dur) was elected as the fourth president of Indonesia, outmanoeuvring Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, for the position. Gus Dur was widely respected as a moderate and inclusive Muslim leader but was 
ineffective as president. Within two years, Megawati was able to push him aside and become president herself.1 It 
was only after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (often called SBY) won office in 2004 in the first direct election for the 
presidency that there was again a prolonged period of stability in the office of the president of Indonesia.2
If presidential leadership—that is, the style, attitudes and political skills of the president—has made such a 
difference in Indonesia in recent decades, what challenges will Joko Widodo face when taking office in October 
this year? How much room to manoeuvre will the new president have, bearing in mind that the current Indonesian 
political system is rather similar to that of the US, where the president often faces opposition in the legislature in 
designing and implementing policy reforms? What are the key economic issues that the new president will face? 
Which social issues, of the many urgent matters that Indonesian citizens want to see addressed, is Widodo likely to 
be called upon to respond to quickly? What are the different strategies of government open to the new president?
CHAPTER 2
A stocktake
Indonesia has coped surprisingly well with a period of tumultuous change since the end of the Soeharto era in 1998. 
A stocktake of the state of the nation at the end of the SBY era can assess the state of play under five main headings: 
the political system; economic challenges; government and administration; social issues; and foreign affairs.
Political system
In 1999, at the beginning of the Era Reformasi, as the early post-Soeharto period is generally described, the 
Indonesian political system was in a state of remarkable flux. Some observers have argued that the sharp break 
with authoritarian political processes of the past opened an era of vigorous democracy in Indonesia (Witoelar 2002). 
Others have been more cautious, noting that Indonesia perhaps still needs ‘strong leadership’ to achieve important 
national goals.
Like political systems in other countries, the political system in Indonesia can usefully be seen as an industry. 
There’s a structure to the industry: there are ‘firms’ (that is, political parties); there are financial flows within the 
industry (often controversial) because revenues are needed to finance the activities of the firms and the supporters 
of the parties; and the firms set strategic goals and design products (just as corporations do) with the aim of 
expanding their role and increasing their power in the domestic political market. Furthermore, the firms vie with 
each other in a highly competitive political market to meet the demands of voters and other supporters who are 
active in the market.
The strengths of the political system as it has evolved in the past decade are considerable (Table 1). All of the main 
institutions and actors in the system (both organisations and individuals) acknowledge the importance of adhering 
to constitutional and other legal processes. In principle, at least, there’s an expectation that senior government and 
political leaders will commit themselves to making decisions that reflect the national interest. Public policy debate 
is very vigorous, both in legislatures and especially in the national media, and well-known public commentators 
and a wide range of specialists from the academic world and community groups are invited to contribute to public 
comment. The political system, too, is highly contestable, with numerous political parties competing to attract 
support in the political market. Reflecting the vigour of the political industry, legislatures at all levels of government 
in Indonesia (national, provincial and district) are active in asserting their authority in key areas of policy that come 
before them.
On the other hand, it’s widely acknowledged that (as in many other countries) the political system’s in need of 
reform in key areas (Aspinall & Mietzner 2010). While important parts of the Indonesian system are in a state of flux, 
other parts reflect enduring elements of social and political life that have been evident in Indonesia at least since 
independence (Feith & Castles 1970). For example, since independence Indonesia has had a multiplicity of parties. 
During the 1970s, Soeharto encouraged mergers of the various parties into three main groups—a functional group, 
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a nationalist group and a religious group. However, although the forced merger more or less existed for nearly three 
decades, it was never especially successful. And as soon as the Era Reformasi began after Soeharto’s resignation, 
the number of parties swelled, reflecting various different groups and personalities (Aspinall & Mietzner 2010, 
Chapter 1). The result is that the structure of the current political system in Indonesia is rather fragmented. There are 
several large parties—none of which is able to dominate the processes of government alone—and a range of smaller 
parties that are usually quite willing to consider coalitions with the main parties, depending on the arrangements 
that might be agreed to.
Table 1: Political parties
Strengths Weaknesses
• Most main actors acknowledge the importance of the 
rule of law and due process in such things as elections 
and appointments to senior political office, and are 
expected to observe the rules.
• Public policy debate is very democratic: a wide range of 
views is presented in parliament and the media.
• The system is highly contestable. There are several 
major parties and a wide range of smaller parties 
competing at most levels of government.
• The legislatures (at all levels—national, provincial and 
district) are active and influential.
• The political system is rather fragmented. There’s a large 
number of small, fairly weak, parties and only a few large, 
strong ones. However, the various parties’ methods of 
operation and often even their main ideas are rather similar; 
even the large parties often do not formulate clear policies on 
issues of national concern.
• ‘Money politics’ is ubiquitous. Parties need substantial 
revenues, but in most cases neither their source of funds nor 
their accountability is clear.
• The division of powers between the president (administration) 
and the legislature is somewhat uncertain and has been in flux 
since the end of the Soeharto era.
• Elites (at all levels—national, provincial and district) are 
powerful. The result is that entry into political activity is not 
easy unless entrants are well connected.
Another feature of the political system in Indonesia (common in many other countries as well) is ‘money politics’ 
(Susanto 2014). The precise meaning of this term, widely used in Indonesia, isn’t always clear. However, it’s usually 
taken to imply that many of the important items allocated through the political system (such as senior party 
positions, seats in legislatures, senior government appointments, government contracts and commercial licences) 
are often for sale. In other words, the suggestion is that government allocations that should be decided through due 
processes and merit under the principles of good government and effective administration are instead ‘marketised’ 
and often bought and sold through the political system.
This causes many problems. For example, because it’s widely believed that money politics is virtually ubiquitous 
across the political system, there’s much cynicism about the political process and about political leaders in 
Indonesia. The marketisation of important parts of the government system both weakens the internal processes of 
government and contributes to widespread social disillusionment about the reliability and honesty of government.
The factors that underpin money politics in Indonesia aren’t easy to deal with. First, the political parties are firms 
operating in a highly competitive industry and need substantial revenues to cover the costs of their operations 
(Sherlock 2010). The parties are expected to maintain headquarters, usually in Jakarta, and local offices across 
Indonesia; leaders are expected to travel frequently, often accompanied by a large entourage; and large party 
conferences, often held in upmarket hotels and attended by hundreds of delegates and guests, are expensive 
activities that are regarded as a necessary part of doing business for the parties. But the topic of political financing 
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isn’t often addressed in Indonesia in a measured way. It’s widely agreed that political financing is a problem, but few 
observers have identified any practical solutions to the issue.
Second, the rule of law is weak. The laws and regulations covering political financing are often vague. The rules leave 
a good deal of room for fundraisers and contributors to manoeuvre. Furthermore, the overall legal system is often 
ineffective. Attempts to enforce the laws are haphazard.3 In recent years, the well-regarded Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan korupsi) has succeeded in having some high-profile political figures imprisoned 
after convictions for illegal fundraising. However, so far, the disincentive effects of the commission’s work seem to 
have been limited.
Third, the rewards for buying and selling political favours are high, both for the individuals who arrange the deals 
and for the political parties that facilitate them. Without the kinds of financial deals that are regularly reported as 
taking place, a staff member in a political party or a middle-ranking public servant might expect to be able to earn 
an income of around $5,000 a year. But it’s clear, both from the lifestyles of some senior politicians and senior public 
servants and from media reports, that individuals actively involved in money politics have incomes of perhaps 
$50,000 or more. Whatever the precise details (and reliable information is hard to come by), participants in money 
politics can sometimes hope to increase their incomes by a factor of ten or more. For many people, this is a strong 
incentive to enter the market, despite the risks that are attached to the activity.
Two other features of the current Indonesian political 
system are often seen as posing problems: the division of 
powers between the president (the administration) and 
the legislature, and the dominant role of elites.
Two other features of the current Indonesian political system are often seen as posing problems: the division of 
powers between the president (the administration) and the legislature, and the dominant role of elites.
In Indonesia, there’s significant support for a strong presidency. Many citizens express the hope that the president 
will exercise firm leadership to address strategic issues. As a result, there are often calls for ‘leaders with courage’ 
and ‘decisive leaders.’ In the view of many commentators, the strong support that emerged for Prabowo Subianto, 
the losing candidate in the recent presidential election, reflected such yearning on the part of many voters.
In practice, many of the issues that citizens look to the president and other leaders to tackle (such as corruption, 
violence of various kinds, and worthwhile improvements to basic public services) aren’t amenable to easy solutions. 
One major problem, taken up below, is the cumbersome nature of the bureaucracy. But another major problem 
is that—just as in the US—the President of Indonesia must often rely on the approval of the Indonesian People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) to progress proposed policy measures. And just as the Congress 
in the US often chooses to amend proposals from the US President, so the parliament in Indonesia often wishes to 
review policy proposals from the Indonesian President in considerable detail.
The dominant role of elites—political, business (sometimes called ‘oligarchs’), military, media and administrative—is 
another key feature of the Indonesian political system. The need to look for compromises across the different elites 
has been a challenge for presidents of Indonesia and their ministers since independence.
The Indonesian elites often interlink in various ways at the national and regional levels and wield considerable 
power. The real power of the Indonesian President and the cabinet is therefore often quite limited. Actors in the 
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political elite usually draw their power from their positions in political parties and are thus inclined to look to their 
parties for guidance when public policy is being considered. Since a significant proportion of cabinet ministers in 
Indonesia in recent years have been appointed partly because of party backing, the President can’t always be sure 
of undivided loyalty, even within the cabinet.
As in many other countries, political power and business activities in Indonesia are often intermingled, especially 
because of the ubiquity of money politics.4 Aburizal Bakrie, one of Indonesia’s most well-known business leaders, 
has been a dominant figure in the large Golkar party in recent years. It was widely expected that Bakrie would run 
for president in the 2014 election, until it became clear that there was little public support for his candidacy. Many 
other well-known national and regional business figures provided resources to political candidates and parties 
during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential election campaigns. Hashim Djojohadikusumo supported the 
presidential bid of his brother Prabowo Subianto; Surya Paloh is chair of the Nasdem Party, which supported Joko 
Widodo in the presidential campaign; Jusuf kalla joined Widodo’s campaign as the vice presidential candidate; and 
so on (some details are in Yogaswara 2008).
The military, too, continues to exercise considerable 
influence in Indonesia. The armed forces are a highly 
respected institution...
The military, too, continues to exercise considerable influence in Indonesia. The armed forces are a highly respected 
institution: public opinion polls indicate that, among government institutions, the military consistently ranks as 
among the most trusted organisations in the country. Although the military voluntarily agreed to withdraw from 
official representation in the Indonesian parliament as part of the reforms that followed the end of the Soeharto 
era, non-active military figures often occupy senior roles in government. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono rose 
to the rank of lieutenant general before being appointed to cabinet in 1999, and Prabowo Subianto, one of the two 
main presidential contenders in the recent presidential election, was also a lieutenant general in the army before he 
was discharged from service in 1998.
The media have become much more influential with the strengthening of democratic practices in Indonesia in 
recent years. While it’s true that some business tycoons have developed strong market positions in some parts of 
the media, especially TV, other parts are highly competitive (Ahmad 2011). Politicians and political parties have been 
paying much closer attention to the need to project an effective media presence.
The Indonesian bureaucracy is also influential, so the president and cabinet of the day must develop managerial 
techniques to work with it as effectively as possible. In practice, senior political leaders in Indonesia often express 
considerable frustration with the sluggish responses that they say they experience in dealing with government 
officials. In turn, the officials point out the realities of administration in Indonesia: that many government agencies 
must exist on shoestring budgets; that, while officials are rightly expected to follow regulatory procedures in their 
daily jobs, many of the rules and regulations that govern the bureaucracy are excessively complex and in some cases 
almost unworkable; and that most of the citizens who live and work in the informal economy often largely ignore 
government procedures anyway.
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Economy
The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis imposed very severe costs on the Indonesian economy. Before the crisis, the 
economy had been growing strongly around 7% per year. After the crisis, it took almost a decade for growth to 
return to around 6% (Figure 1), and it hasn’t improved much since. For reasons that aren’t clear, it seems that the 
economic ‘speed limit’ of the economy is now constrained at around 1% less than was possible before the crisis.
Figure 1: Economic growth in Indonesia, 1989 to 2012 (% per year)
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Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators, accessible at www.adb.org.
Nevertheless, a sustained annual economic growth rate of 6% is hardly disappointing. From this point of view, the 
economy was well managed during most of the second term of SBY’s period in office. This performance reflected a 
favourable external environment along with good domestic monetary management and a disciplined approach to 
fiscal policy (Table 2).
So far, so good. But recently—since around mid-2012—some worrying signs have begun to appear. The most 
noticeable change in overall economic performance during the past two years has been a marked slowing in the 
growth rate (Figure 2). The overall annual growth rate, which was comfortably over 6% during 2011, began to ease 
downwards. Most recent data for early 2014 suggests that the economy is now growing at just over 5% a year.5 Many 
observers would prefer to see growth moving back towards 7% a year on a long-term basis (ACDGI 2013).6
A strong growth rate of at least 6% is needed to create enough jobs for the expanding labour force and to combat 
poverty. The level of overall poverty edged steadily downwards during the past decade, to include less than 12% of 
the national population at the end of 2013. But the official poverty line is a harsh measure of less than $1.00 per day. 
Even modest increases in the poverty threshold lead to much larger numbers of people being recorded as poor; if 
$2 per day were used as the threshold, almost 50% of Indonesians would be classified as poor.
The recent slowing in growth is therefore one of the key economic challenges that Indonesia’s new president will 
need to address upon taking office. One factor contributing to the slowdown appears to be difficulties that have 
emerged in the balance of payments. For a range of reasons, exports have weakened somewhat during the past few 
years while imports have remained quite strong. The balance on the current account, which had been in surplus, has 
thus moved into deficit. The authorities responded appropriately by allowing the foreign exchange rate to adjust 
(that is, to depreciate), but this hasn’t been enough to reverse the deficit on the current account.
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Table 2: Economic issues
Strengths Weaknesses
• Sustained recovery from the 1997–98 Asian financial 
crisis and strong economic growth in recent years.
• Highly flexible domestic market structures in many 
parts of the large informal economy in such sectors as 
agriculture, small-scale industries, many local service 
industries, and labour markets.
• Flexibility in monetary policy, including in allowing 
the foreign exchange rate to adjust in response to 
balance-of-payments pressures.
• Careful management of fiscal policy, reflected in 
consistently low budget deficits.
• Highly disciplined reduction of national debt in the 
decade following the Asian financial crisis.
• A boost to growth from strong terms of trade in recent 
years.
• Widespread opportunities to lift productivity.
• Widespread poverty, which, among other things, contributes 
to the challenges of economic management in most sectors of 
the economy.
• A slowing in economic growth since 2012, reflecting a lack 
of policy response to external pressures on the Indonesian 
economy.
• Continuing difficulties in some key aspects of fiscal 
management, such as curbing fuel subsidies.
• Marked supply-side problems in some sectors, especially the 
manufacturing, mining and oil industries.
• Low levels of investment in infrastructure, contributing to 
supply-side challenges in other sectors.
• A need to adjust to a deteriorating external economic 
environment since 2012.
• Sluggishness in taking advantage of opportunities to boost 
efficiency.
Figure 2: Economic growth in Indonesia, by quarters, 2009 to 2014 (% per year)
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Source: Government of Indonesia, Central Bureau of Statistics, Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Indonesia [Indonesian Economic Growth], 
quarterly publications, accessible at www.bps.go.id. 
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In fact, a sustained deficit on the current account wouldn’t necessarily be a problem, provided that Indonesian 
policymakers could be confident of access to international capital markets at reasonable interest rates.7 But those 
markets have sometimes been volatile, especially after the global financial crisis of 2008–09. In mid-2013, a number 
of developing countries in Asia, especially India and Indonesia, experienced sudden unexpected outflows of capital 
when international markets reacted to a possible change in monetary policy in the US (a ‘tapering’ of policy) by 
withdrawing capital from emerging markets. This so-called ‘taper tantrum’ exerted sharp pressure on the foreign 
exchange rates in countries hit by the outflows (klemm et al. 20).
Indonesian policymakers also face a range of other 
challenges in finding ways to lift the economic growth rate 
towards the 7% mark.
But Indonesian policymakers also face a range of other challenges in finding ways to lift the economic growth rate 
towards the 7% mark. First, although fiscal policy has been conducted in a disciplined way in an overall sense, 
there are well-known problems of implementation on both the income and the expenditure side of the Indonesian 
budget. On the income side, revenues (currently around 16% of GDP) are far too low; on the expenditure side, fuel 
subsidies (currently running at around $30 billion a year) are inequitable and are crowding out other much-needed 
spending (IMF 2013). One view is that a new president will be able to tackle these fiscal problems with new 
determination in a way that wasn’t possible for SBY in his second term. Another view is that the resistance to fiscal 
reform will be strong and that populist opposition in the parliament will frustrate policy change.
A second major problem is the need to promote infrastructure spending. National spending on infrastructure 
(public and private sector combined) is clearly too low. For more than a decade since the 1997–98 crisis, investment 
in infrastructure in Indonesia has trended around 3% or 4% of GDP. This is significantly lower than the 7% level 
widely regarded as necessary to support a strong economic growth rate (World Bank 2013). It won’t be easy for 
policymakers to overcome the various bottlenecks choking off higher investment in the infrastructure sector. Much 
more effective coordination of policy across government at both the national and the regional levels will be needed 
than has apparently been possible in recent years (ACDGI 2013, Chapter 3).
Third, a range of other issues need to be tackled to stimulate higher growth. key sectoral challenges include revising 
policy to encourage significantly increased investment, including foreign investment in the oil and mining sectors, 
finding ways to encourage growth in lagging manufacturing industries, and facilitating expansion in promising 
service industries. A set of policies to tackle these and other matters is being prepared for inclusion in a new draft 
National Medium Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangkah Menengah Nasional) for the five years to 
2019. The new plan will become official policy after it’s considered by the incoming president in late 2014.
From one point of view, the long agenda that needs to be worked through to promote higher growth is very 
daunting. Some observers find it hard to be optimistic. A recent survey prepared by a team from the Harvard 
kennedy School (ACDGI 2013) points to many difficulties and argues that a set of transformative policies is needed 
to move Indonesia onto a higher development trajectory. But from another point of view, the potential for sustained 
growth in Indonesia is promising. Productivity in many economic sectors in Indonesia is still low by world standards, 
suggesting that opportunities for rapid productivity growth are there for the taking. Furthermore, many domestic 
markets in Indonesia are extremely flexible, especially in the informal economy, which is often estimated to include 
over 60% of the Indonesian labour force. Free movement in these markets, sometimes almost entirely unregulated, 
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gives the Indonesian economy a flexibility denied to markets in Europe (sometimes described as ‘sclerotic’) and 
other developed countries.
It’s true that the economic flexibility in Indonesia’s informal economy has downsides (regulatory standards are often 
ignored and risks are often high). But the upside is that resources can shift rapidly between sectors in response 
to changing market circumstances in a way that makes OECD economies look very cumbersome. Informality has 
important benefits as well as significant costs.
It’s widely recognised in Indonesia that government 
processes, and the operations of the bureaucracy, 
aren’t satisfactory.
Government and administration
It’s widely recognised in Indonesia that government processes, and the operations of the bureaucracy, aren’t 
satisfactory (Mardiasmo et al. 2008). There’s almost universal agreement that reform is needed (Effendi 2011, 
2013). Critics point (constantly) to many well-known problems with the bureaucracy at all levels of government: the 
bureaucracy’s widely regarded as unresponsive; processes are cumbersome; everything takes too long; payments 
are often needed to move documents forward; and the results of all of this are very disappointing. Clearly, there are 
major problems with public sector delivery in Indonesia (World Bank 2012, Olken 2013).
In principle, sustained efforts are being made to tackle these issues (Table 3). There have been many studies of 
problems in public sector delivery in Indonesia (Effendi 2010). Many programs aimed at introducing improved 
management practices in the public sector have been introduced in government departments and agencies at the 
national and regional levels. In many departments, detailed and transparent internal guidelines have been issued 
to staff to define the rights and responsibilities of public servants.8 There’s no shortage of suggestions about the 
measures needed to improve public sector management (Table 4).
Many of the suggested activities incorporate most of the main well-known aspects of public sector reforms listed 
in OECD countries’ public sector programs. Many programs in Indonesia are supported by the clear definition of 
goals, steps for the implementation of activities are spelt out, measurable performance indicators are listed, and 
time-bound targets are laid out. In principle, government processes are usually designed to minimise the scope for 
arbitrary discretion on the part of officials.
But the downside is that the severe resource constraints that government agencies face are often not allowed for. 
In practice, many agencies, especially at the regional and local levels, are severely cash-strapped. For example, 
government spending at the provincial level in 2010 outside Jakarta was an extraordinarily low $40 per capita 
(calculated from CBS 2012). It’s barely possible for governments to provide significant services when budgets are 
so limited.
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Table 3: Government and administration
Strengths Weaknesses
• There’s widespread recognition in Indonesia that 
bureaucratic processes aren’t satisfactory and that 
reform is needed.
• Many efforts to introduce better management practices 
(such as setting and monitoring key performance 
indicators for government agencies) are underway at all 
levels of government across the country.
• In principle, government processes are rule-driven and 
are designed to minimise the scope for individual and 
arbitrary discretion on the part of officials.
• The codification and clarification of government 
processes is continuing at all levels of government, with 
the aim of making government more efficient, more 
transparent and fairer.
• The overall transparency of government is increasing. 
More public reports with better data are being released, 
and regular community consultations with stakeholders 
about government policies are commonly held.
• Government departments and agencies are increasingly 
responsive to legislatures.
• There are severe resource constraints on government agencies 
at all levels. Budgets are often extremely limited, and many 
agencies have problems with the number and quality of staff.
• The legal system is quite weak. Legal institutions (courts, 
police, private legal practices) are severely under-resourced, so 
that in practice much of the system is dysfunctional.
• Efforts at bureaucratic reform have proceeded slowly, often 
meeting resistance both inside and outside of the bureaucracy. 
Corruption is widely acknowledged as a major problem: links 
between power-holders and donors are widely believed to 
favour powerful commercial actors at the expense of the public 
interest.
• There’s too much red tape. There are so many rules and 
regulations that staff are often obliged to look for ways to bend 
them, undermining due process.
• There’s little emphasis on evaluating results or providing 
incentives for officials that reward them for results.
• Processes of disclosure and transparency, although improving, 
are still often unsatisfactory. 
Another serious problem is that the Indonesian legal system is weak (Lev 2000). The problem begins at the 
top, where the Indonesian Parliament passes only a very small number of bills each year. The legal system is 
underfinanced, overburdened with demands on courts and supporting infrastructure, and mostly staffed by 
judges, court officials and administrators on low salaries.9 There are more than 6,000 judges in Indonesia but many 
of them work for low official salaries and even need to look for additional sources of income, such as lecturing in 
local universities, to supplement their incomes. In 2012, the Indonesian Judicial Commission suggested that an 
acceptable salary for judges might be around Rp7 million per month (around $700 per month at the time) and 
noted that, in practice, many judges received rather less than that in official payments.10
The weakness of the legal system has widespread consequences. One is that many actors in Indonesia—in the 
private sector, in the bureaucracy, in civil society, and in the political system—look for extra-legal ways to settle 
disputes. Those methods include reliance on informal interventions by senior figures, such as military or policy 
officials and respected religious leaders, payments between disputing parties, and the recruitment of local gangs 
who offer their services for hire. Another consequence is that many commercial activities are carried on in a vague 
legal environment in which the law of contract is often rather uncertain and it’s often difficult to settle such matters 
as whether a party to a contract is solvent or not. Indonesian firms often find practical ways of operating in this 
environment, while foreign investors find it hard to cope with the legal uncertainty.
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Table 4: World Bank proposals for public sector reform in Indonesia
Key messages of public sector reform in Indonesia
Indonesia needs to continue to modernize its civil service and build upon the impressive governance, policy, and public finance 
management reforms of the past decade. A number of structural, organizational and institutional policy reform issues to be 
addressed over the next five years are as follows:
1. Reform the existing pay/grading scheme: Replace the current system, which is characterized by low basic pay and numerous 
allowances, with a single pay structure with greater transparency linking remuneration to performance, and harmonized 
salary levels across the public sector.
2. Modernize the civil service pension plan: Replace the current defined benefit, pay-as-you-go system with a prefinanced 
defined contribution scheme.
3. Strengthen staffing controls in order to rein in the on-going expansion of the civil service and its administrative 
budget implications.
4. Allow flexible organizational design and staffing to provide for structures and staffing levels based on real operational needs 
rather than standardized ‘policy’ requirements.
5. Reform civil service HR policies to provide for a modernized, more flexible system and a professional, performance-oriented 
work force.
Source: World Bank, Indonesia rising, 2009
A third consequence is that it’s difficult for the bureaucracy to operate effectively under significant legal uncertainty. 
In recent years in Indonesia, the work of anticorruption agencies such as the Corruption Eradication Commission 
has led to high-profile prosecutions of many senior politicians and officials. As a result, many government officials 
have become increasingly risk-averse and cautious in their decisions. After all, if the law is vague and if there’s a risk 
of prosecution after controversial decisions, the safest thing to do is to avoid making decisions.
Another major problem affecting the processes of government and administration in Indonesia is that efforts 
at bureaucratic reform have proceeded rather slowly. In the early years of SBY’s second term, in 2010 and 2011, 
there was talk of a program of bureaucratic reform. But the plans for reform reportedly ran into considerable 
resistance within the bureaucracy and within parliament (Parlina & Atmanta 2013). Nevertheless, the approval of 
an important new Civil Service Law in early 2014 (Law No. 5 of 2014) opened the way for substantial reforms (Effendi 
2014). In principle, the incoming Widodo administration will be able to move forward with a program to promote 
performance-oriented outcomes in the government sector.
Social issues
Since the transition to the Era Reformasi, social acceptance of democratic expression and openness to a wide range 
of views about social issues have increased dramatically in Indonesia (Table 5). In many respects, Indonesia’s now 
a very pluralistic society. Most people in elite positions believe in the principles of flexibility and tolerance, and that 
those principles, combined with loyalty to the idea of Indonesia, help hold the diverse nation together. The national 
motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), is more than just a motto: it captures the acceptance of diversity 
found across Indonesia.
Of course, unsurprisingly in a nation of more than 250 million people, there are notable instances of intolerance. 
The rights of minority groups aren’t always respected, especially at the local level when local disputes flare up. The 
state doesn’t always step in to provide protection when there are reports of infringements of rights. International 
comment on these issues is reflected in the annual Human rights reports prepared by the US State Department. 
In February 2014, Secretary of State kerry submitted to the US Congress the 2013 annual report, which contained 
comment about issues in Indonesia as well as many other countries.11
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But those issues are hardly ignored within Indonesia. There’s vigorous public debate about civil liberties in the 
media and in civil society. Government authorities are often sharply criticised for failing to act when there have 
been apparent breaches of liberties. Indonesian citizens, often acting with the support of important community 
organisations, vigorously debate what measures are needed to strengthen human rights. The vitality of that debate 
is one of the defining characteristics of public life in Indonesia since the transition to the Era Reformasi.
Community, religious, social and academic groups are very active, as are trade unions when issues touching on 
labour rights are being discussed. And the volunteer (relawan) movement was widely credited as having played 
a vital role in supporting Joko Widodo in the recent presidential election. Indonesia in 2014 is a country with very 
wide freedoms.
Paradoxically, the relatively light presence of the state is one of the factors contributing to freedom in Indonesia.12 
While it’s true that the state sometimes fails to provide protections that minority groups look for, it’s also true that 
the state isn’t especially intrusive on the lives of ordinary citizens. This isn’t necessarily because state agencies 
lack the will to intervene, but because their limited resources mean that they can’t. In practice, officials adopt a 
live-and-let-live attitude towards the activities of citizens, the bulk of whom carry out a great deal of their activities 
in the informal economy. Local authorities hope that citizens won’t disturb the peace. Provided citizens don’t do so, 
much of the time officials are happy enough to enjoy a quiet life.
The other side of the coin is that civil society groups are, like the state, often unable to find solutions to difficult 
community problems or provide protection to vulnerable groups. Many civil society groups aren’t well organised. 
Most operate with restricted budgets and can only provide modest salaries. Furthermore, the extreme diversity of 
civil society means that confused and sometimes contradictory messages are presented. And many activists in civil 
society groups tend to be self-selected, so it’s not clear how representative they are. The most effective groups are 
often based in Jakarta or other main urban areas and have effective links with the media. Minority groups in rural 
areas or in outlying provinces find it hard to make their voices heard. Sometimes, they’re affected by serious neglect 
or outright violence.13
Table 5: Social issues
Strengths Weaknesses
• Indonesian society is generally tolerant and accepting 
of religious, ethnic and social differences. All main 
national institutions endorse ideals of tolerance and, 
with some notable exceptions, principles of pluralism 
are widely accepted.
• The media is strong; social issues get wide coverage in 
the public media.
• Community, religious and social groups are quite 
influential. Religious groups, particularly, are 
recognised as important players in the public policy 
debate.
• Civil society groups such as trade unions, commercial 
groups, student groups and other organisations are 
recognised as important participants in the public 
policy debate and get a good hearing in the media and 
in the legislatures.
• Civil society groups are sometimes not well organised. 
Confused and diverse advocacy messages are presented to the 
public media.
• It’s sometimes not clear how representative civil society groups 
are. Some activists appear to be self-selected and not really 
representative of the groups they claim to represent.
• There’s such a large number of civil society groups that the 
sector sometimes appears to be quite disorganised.
• Minority groups, especially religious minority groups and 
ethnic groups in outlying provinces, sometimes don’t get 
adequate protection for their legitimate activities. There have 
been some quite serious abuses of the rights of minority 
groups.
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Foreign affairs
Indonesia’s foreign policy since Sukarno’s declaration of independence in 1945 has shown some marked 
continuities. With the notable exception of the tumultuous approach to policy during the adventurous period of the 
Sukarno presidency (1945–1966), Indonesian presidents have generally been cautious in international affairs and 
have tended to rely on a well-established emphasis on a ‘free and active’ approach to foreign policy (Table 6). The 
broad outlines of the first 50 years of Indonesian foreign policy were recently summarised by Jusuf Wanandi, a close 
observer of and participant in policy affairs in Indonesia:
Sukarno was flamboyant and outgoing and had a similarly outsized reputation abroad; Suharto did not, at 
least for the first 20 years. Suharto just did not have the personality for international relations. He was shy, 
inward-looking, very Javanese and indirect … [D]espite leaning towards the West, the basic non-alignment 
foreign policy he inherited from Sukarno remained. The Foreign Ministry was steeped in the thinking that in 
the implementation of policy, some freedom and independence would always be maintained, whatever the 
circumstances the country faced. Because in the end Indonesia’s foreign policy, based on non-alignment, meant 
in practice the freedom to choose. (Wanandi 2012:265)
Since the mid-1970s, an emphasis on working with ASEAN partners has been a central feature of Indonesian 
foreign policy.
Table 6: Foreign policy
Strengths Weaknesses
• Clear and well-established emphasis on a ‘free and 
active’ foreign policy.
• Firm and longstanding emphasis on maintaining a 
non-aligned position.
• Experience in weighing Indonesia’s interests carefully 
in response to various proposals from the major 
international powers in Asia.
• Strong bonds with ASEAN; Indonesia plays a leadership 
role in the region.
• Long and well-established institutional experience of 
the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, staffed by 
very experienced senior diplomats.
• Effective connections with multilateral agencies such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
UN and the Asian Development Bank.
• An emphasis on non-alignment and a preference for a 
consensual approach, including within ASEAN, which 
sometimes masks efforts to define Indonesia’s own interests 
clearly.
• An inclination to look to multilateral institutions for support, 
which can dilute bilateral messages from Indonesia.
• Financial and other resource constraints, which sometimes 
restrict the effectiveness of Indonesian diplomacy.
• Urgent domestic issues often limit the attention that 
Indonesian leaders can give to international affairs.
Consistent with the power with which medium-sized developing countries can usually support their interests, 
Indonesia has often given priority to regional and multilateral diplomacy rather than bilateral diplomacy to respond 
to international issues.14 As just one example, in responding to unauthorised boat arrivals in Australia from late 
2013, the Australian Government has tended to rely on bilateral relationships to discuss possible approaches 
with neighbouring countries. In contrast, Indonesia has indicated a clear preference for dealing with the issue 
through the Bali Process established in 2002 to provide a regional framework for dealing with people smuggling, 
transnational crime and associated issues.15
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Building regional strength and influence through support for the development of ASEAN has been a key part of 
Indonesia’s approach to diplomacy for over four decades. At first, during the first decade or so of attempts to build 
cooperation in the region within ASEAN, progress appeared to be slow. In international circles, the cautious ‘ASEAN 
way’, which emphasised consensus and careful mutual respect for the different systems of government and values 
across Southeast Asia, was sometimes regarded as rather ineffective. But ASEAN has slowly emerged to become 
a very successful regional organisation. The total population in ASEAN is now more than 600 million, and its GDP 
(PPD) will soon be over $4 trillion (Table 7). Provided current programs of effective cooperation are sustained, the 
prospects for ASEAN are encouraging.
Table 7: ASEAN Key Statistics, 2012
Mid-year 
pop. 2012 (mill)
% GDP 
(PPP) 
2012 (US$b)
% GDP 
(PPP) 
per capita US$
Index
Indonesia 247 40 1,223 33 4,947 82
Philippines 96 16 427 11 4,457 74
Vietnam 89 14 355 10 3,998 66
Thailand 64 10 692 19 10,745 177
Myanmar 61 10 110 3 1,803 30
Malaysia 29 5 501 13 17,099 282
Cambodia 15 2 37 1 2,500 41
Laos 6 1 19 1 2,923 48
Singapore 5 1 328 9 61,887 1,022
Brunei 0.4 … 22 1 55,000 909
TOTALS 613 100 3,714 100 6,054 100
Comparator countries
China 1,354 12,471 9,210
India 1,213 4,793 3,950
Japan 128 4,491 35,196
Australia 23 1,008 44,405
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: Asian Development Bank, annual Key Indicators.
Several implications flow from the Indonesian authorities’ inclination to rely on regional and multilateral channels in 
conducting international diplomacy. The advantage is that much of the detailed administrative work of negotiations 
is passed over to regional and international agencies; the disadvantage is that Indonesian representatives can 
find it hard to keep up with the flow of manoeuvres when there’s rapid progress in negotiations. And if Indonesia 
is expected to reflect the views of the ten ASEAN countries (as is sometimes the case), its own interests can 
sometimes be diluted in the broader ASEAN framework. A final challenge for Indonesian diplomacy that has 
become increasingly important in recent years is ensuring that Indonesia can fully participate at the leadership 
level at international meetings such as APEC, the East Asia Summit and G20 conferences. The incoming President of 
Indonesia will find the international conference schedule quite pressing as soon as he takes office on 20 October. In 
early November, there will be heads-of-government APEC, East Asia Summit and G20 conferences where there will 
be opportunities for him to outline his government’s foreign policy priorities.
The period ahead
What are the prospects for Indonesia over the next five years, as a new president takes office? It’s helpful to consider 
two scenarios that, depending on events, Indonesia might follow during the next five years: a reform scenario and a 
resilience scenario.
Of course, other scenarios are possible. The recent Harvard kennedy School study suggested that it’s useful to 
consider three possible paths: a reactive path, a proactive approach, and a transformative set of policies (ACDGI 
2013). The study described the reactive path as best reflecting the Indonesian Government’s current approach of 
tending to ‘muddle through’16; the proactive approach refers to the government’s practice of tackling reform mainly 
as a response to a major crisis; and the transformative set of policies characterises the energetic reform approach 
seen, for example, in the past half-century in the four ‘Asian tigers’ (South korea, Taiwan, Hong kong and Singapore). 
The Harvard study considered these possible paths partly so that desirable sets of policies might be identified.
 The two reform and resilience scenarios are taken as 
benchmarks for more optimistic and more problematic 
paths that Indonesia might follow during the five-year 
term of the incoming president.
Rather than suggesting specific policy options here, the two reform and resilience scenarios are taken as 
benchmarks for more optimistic and more problematic paths that Indonesia might follow during the five-year term 
of the incoming president.
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Reform scenario
Not surprisingly, after the vigour of two extremely competitive political campaigns in Indonesia (for legislatures 
across Indonesia in early April and for the presidency in early July), high hopes are widely held for a new president. 
Those high expectations pose problems for President Joko Widodo. After speaking of many bold reforms during the 
election campaign, he risks coming to be seen as overpromising and underdelivering.
Widodo has had no experience as a minister or as a member of cabinet. His time in administration in Indonesia has 
mainly been spent as the mayor (Walikota) of Surakarta, a middle-sized town in Central Java, from 2005 to 2012. He’s 
widely credited as having been a successful and popular mayor who introduced significant reforms in Surakarta. 
But it remains to be seen how effectively that experience, combined with the short time he spent as Governor of 
Jakarta from 2012, will carry over as he responds to the much wider challenges that he must deal with as President 
of Indonesia.
Politics
The new president will face early political challenges on several fronts. He’ll need to focus his attention on several 
important issues.
First, his relations with the main party that supported him, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan, PDI-P), are said to be under some strain. From one point of view, it seems 
remarkable that the leaders of the PDI-P, including former president of Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri, show any 
reluctance in demonstrating wholehearted support for their chosen candidate. After all, Joko Widodo has delivered 
the presidency to the Democratic Party, along with all of the powers and opportunities for patronage that go with 
the position. But from another point of view, the nagging worries that the traditional elite within the PDI-P have 
about their relations with Widodo after his victory are perhaps understandable. As president, Widodo will take on all 
of the authorities of the presidential office and will have less immediate need for support from the party. And lately 
he’s has been showing worrying signs of independence. Senior leaders in the PDI-P are said to be uncertain about 
whether Widodo will pay enough attention to the interests of his erstwhile supporters once he becomes president. 
Just as Falstaff found that Prince Hal soon regarded former ties as less useful once he became Henry V,17 so the 
leaders of the Democratic Party are wondering how strong Widodo’s ties to the PDI-P will be once he takes office.
The second major political challenge that Widodo will face as president is in managing relations with the parliament, 
which won’t necessarily be easy. In recent years, the parliament has repeatedly held up and amended proposals 
sent to it by the administration. During the past decade, parliamentary committees have often exercised their right 
to call ministers before them to discuss matters of government policy in detail, sometimes for hours on end. In 
practice, the parliament has very wide powers. In principle, it can even consider the impeachment of the president 
in the way that the senior chamber, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) decided 
on the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), in 2001. For these reasons, the Indonesian President has 
little choice but to take care in considering relations between the administration and the legislature.
If Joko Widodo manages these relationships well in the early months of his presidency, the prospects for strong and 
effective government in Indonesia are good. He has already demonstrated impressive political skills. It’s possible 
that he’ll emerge as a highly effective leader. In retrospect, it’s hard to avoid the impression that he may have had 
his eye on the presidency soon after winning the governorship in Jakarta in September 2012. If so, he hardly put a 
political foot wrong during 2013. He took maximum advantage of the access to national publicity that comes from 
being Governor of Jakarta and handled his media contacts with much skill. Day after day, for months on end, he 
got wide and very positive coverage in the print and electronic media for his populist, open-necked visits to poor 
areas across Jakarta to chat to poor people in markets, in alleyways and along river banks. This blusukan approach, 
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as it’s known, became his trademark. It was immensely popular, not just in Jakarta but across much of the rest 
of Indonesia.
Widodo steadily built up momentum as a possible presidential candidate throughout 2013. By early 2014, the 
leaders in the Democratic Party were under considerable pressure to fall in behind him—and on his terms. For 
months, the key decision-maker in the PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri, dithered over whether to anoint Widodo 
as the party’s preferred candidate. There were many reports suggesting that she was considering a tilt at the 
presidency herself (this would have been the fourth time that she had made a bid for the presidency, following 
earlier unsuccessful attempts in 1999, 2004 and 2009) or, perhaps, supporting her daughter, Puan Maharani. In the 
end, Widodo got his way. He made it look easy, but he had carefully manoeuvred himself into a position in which the 
elite of the Democratic Party had little option. They desperately wanted a firm PDI-P hold on the presidency after 
languishing in opposition for a decade. Widodo, who was widely identified with the Democratic Party, seemed to 
be promising them victory in the presidential elections. What choice did they have? The old PDI-P elite swallowed 
their pride, recognised the strengths of the newcomer from Surakarta, and urged Megawati to recognise the facts of 
political life.
If Widodo, as president, can manage relations with the 
parliament as effectively as he has managed relations 
with the PDI-P, the prospects for effective government in 
Indonesia are good.
If Widodo, as president, can manage relations with the parliament as effectively as he has managed relations with 
the PDI-P, the prospects for effective government in Indonesia are good. But it seems likely that he’ll face significant 
challenges. The upshot of the combined legislative and presidential elections in 2014 leaves him in an uncertain 
position in dealing with the parliament. On one hand, he has (as his predecessor, SBY, had) a good personal mandate 
from the electorate. On the other hand, the combined oppositionist groups that supported Prabowo Subianto in 
the presidential election have a comfortable majority in the legislature. If luck runs his way, as he settles into the 
presidency he may find that a useful portion of the oppositionist groups decide that it would be best to get with 
the strength and work with him in the parliament. If Joko Widodo can gain support in this way, the processes of 
government in Indonesia will be more secure.
Economy
The most urgent economic challenge facing the incoming president is the need to promote economic growth. As 
part of his presidential campaign proposals, Widodo mentioned a target rate of economic growth of 7% per year. 
If he can introduce a package of policies to accelerate growth towards that level, then his position as a reform 
president will be significantly enhanced.
The broad set of policies needed to lift economic performance in Indonesia is reasonably clear. Analysts differ in 
their emphases, but generally agree that the following elements are needed (Gobel 2014ab):
• Improved investment. While the overall level of national investment, at over 30% of GDP, is encouraging, there are 
significant concerns about the composition of the investment. The infrastructure deficit is serious, so increases 
in investment in infrastructure projects are needed. Similarly, investment in the resource sectors—especially 
mining and energy—has been lagging.
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• Reforms to fiscal policy. While the overall stance on fiscal policy is both conservative and responsible, it’s widely 
agreed that reforms on both the income and the expenditure sides of budgetary policy are necessary. On 
the income side, tax revenues are far too low. As Governor of Jakarta, Widodo indicated that he was keen to 
increase revenues for the Jakarta Government. A similar approach will be needed for the national budget. On 
the expenditure side, improved spending arrangements are needed, along with reductions in subsidies. Most of 
these measures will need approval from the national parliament in the annual budget discussions, so successful 
policy reform in this area would be a clear indication that the new administration is confident in addressing 
controversial policy issues.
• Fuel subsidies. Very large fuel subsidies, consistently amounting to well over $20 billion a year (around 15% of 
central government spending), have been the most controversial aspect of fiscal policy in recent years. Senior 
economic policymakers in the outgoing SBY administration all agreed that the subsidies need to be sharply 
reduced, but determined efforts by the government during budget discussions with the parliament in 2012 
and 2013 made little progress in obtaining legislative agreement to reductions. Both Joko Widodo and his Vice 
President, Jusuf kalla, have indicated that they plan to press for a reduction. In an effective reform scenario, 
the Widodo administration will be able to persuade the parliament to sharply reduce energy subsidies so that 
budget expenditures can be reallocated to other sectors, such as infrastructure.
• Infrastructure. Spending on infrastructure has lagged badly in Indonesia during the past decade. As a rough 
rule of thumb, Indonesia needs to be spending perhaps around 7% of GDP on infrastructure investment. This 
was the level sustained for most of the 1990s until the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 (World Bank 2013, figures 
50 and 51; ACDGI 2013, Chapter 3). Since then, however, infrastructure spending has lagged at around 3% of 
GDP, far below the level required to close the ‘infrastructure deficit’ widely recognised as a bottleneck to growth 
in Indonesia. If fuel subsidies can be reduced, the way will be open to reallocate around 2% or more to the 
infrastructure sector.
• Sectoral policies. There are challenges for policymakers in almost all sectors of the Indonesian economy—in 
agriculture, in manufacturing, in services, and in the export-oriented resources sector. Widodo has a background 
as a small-scale businessperson in Surakarta. He has often spoken of the need to foster small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia, so he can be expected to support programs to strengthen the SME sector. Many 
previous efforts to foster growth in the sector have borne little fruit, so that approach is likely to receive wide 
support if the new administration can find effective ways of promoting SMEs. Two other urgent priorities that 
will need early attention are manufacturing policy and measures to address a looming crisis in the oil and mining 
sectors. In manufacturing, the new president will face pressures to support recent protectionist ‘value added’ 
programs that, among other things, have placed new requirements on mining companies to process minerals 
within Indonesia before export. As part of a strong reform program, it would be best if these policies were closely 
evaluated by the new government and perhaps substantially revised. More broadly, in the oil and energy sector, 
the production outlook is grim. Oil production has been steadily declining since the mid-1990s and there’s no 
sign of any early reversal in that trend. As a result, Indonesia has moved from being an oil-exporting country two 
decades ago to facing sharply rising oil imports. New investment in other parts of the energy sector—gas and 
geothermal production—has been sluggish as well. Coal production has risen markedly in recent years, but the 
long-term global prospects of the coal sector are uncertain. A set of new, more investment-friendly policies in the 
energy sector would provide a significant boost to the Indonesian economy over the coming decade.
• Poverty and employment. Before the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, strong economic growth in Indonesia 
generated jobs in agriculture, labour-intensive manufactures and the service sector and helped lift millions 
of people out of poverty. Following the crisis, poverty rose sharply and there was strong pressure on the 
government to establish a system of social safety nets. Joko Widodo, as Governor of Jakarta, introduced a 
new Jakarta Health Card (Kartu Jakarta Sehat) in 2012. He has indicated that he’ll be looking at similar social 
security measures as part of his economic program as president. A recent study by Manning and Sumarto 
(2011) identified five challenges that need to be addressed to improve the quality of social protection in 
Indonesia: improving program targeting; protecting households from shocks; coordinating across government 
departments and levels of government; managing ‘voice’ and ‘noise’; and making decentralisation work. On the 
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other hand, the incoming government will face many calls on the restricted Indonesian national budget, so the 
scope to expand social protection programs will be quite limited.
• ASEAN Economic Community. An early test for the incoming government in international trade policy will be 
measures needed to adjust to trading arrangements consistent with the ASEAN Economic Community, which 
is due to come into effect in 2015.18 Already, the market liberalisation steps likely to be necessary have met 
considerable opposition within Indonesia. More criticisms can be expected as a wider range of liberalisation 
proposals is considered. In practice—and reflecting the generally cautious approach within ASEAN to plans 
for reform—market liberalisation reforms introduced in 2015 can be expected to be modest. Nevertheless, the 
President of Indonesia is one of the key leaders of the ASEAN region. If Widodo supports an outward-looking 
economic reform agenda that supports wider liberalisation across ASEAN, that stance would lend important 
strength to moves to expand the ASEAN Economic Community during the next five years.
There’s no shortage of other economic challenges. Joko Widodo has established a transition team that’s expected 
to focus, among other things, on the state budget, an expanded health sector program, public housing, public 
transport and bureaucratic reform.
Government and administration
The new Civil Service Law No. 5 of 2014 signed into law by SBY earlier this year gives the new administration wide 
powers to promote reform in the public sector. The aim of the law is ambitious: to transform approaches and culture 
across the Indonesian public service.
One main change is that all jobs in national, provincial and regency (district) governments will be included in an 
Indonesian Civil Service. Henceforth, stricter standards are to be set for civil service employees, and staff members 
may be dismissed for poor performance or specified misdemeanours, such as a criminal conviction. There’s to 
be greater emphasis on appointment by merit and a wider use of contracts within the public sector, with specific 
performance requirements. A new independent body, the Indonesian Civil Service Commission, will be appointed 
to oversee the implementation of civil service norms and ethics. Other reforms include improvements to salary and 
pension arrangements and an extension of the retirement age.
During the next few years, public salaries will be increased substantially, government procedures will be 
streamlined, clear performance goals and key performance indicators will be established for official agencies, and 
there will be strong pressure at all levels of government to improve service delivery to the public. In principle, the 
incoming government is well placed to introduce reforms, but the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. There 
will be strong public support for Widodo if he announces a clear program of reform of this kind.
Social issues
Widodo takes office with a large reservoir of goodwill from civil society. He’s regarded as progressive on social issues 
and as having the common touch. He’s seen as far more willing to engage in a relaxed way with ordinary citizens in 
his blusukan style than traditional elite politicians and public servants. Many Indonesians would say that ‘Jokowi is 
one of us.’
The opportunity’s now open to Widodo to build on these strengths. One challenge for him will be to strengthen his 
links with all parts of the Indonesian Muslim community. There were some suggestions from his political opponents 
during the presidential election campaign that he wasn’t as committed to core Muslim values as he might be. He 
and his supporters firmly rejected those suggestions, pointing out that they seemed to be just more of the many 
rumours being spread around as part of the highly competitive politics of the presidential campaign. Indeed, just 
before the presidential poll, Widodo set aside time to visit Mecca on a minor pilgrimage for two days.
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Another main task will be to establish effective links with the labour movement. Trade unions have become 
much more active in Indonesia since the transition from the Soeharto era. At times, labour groups mount forceful 
campaigns in support of wage increases and other labour rights. In late 2012, unions pressed for large wage 
increases of over 40% in the Jakarta area, and Widodo agreed to them. However, legislated wage increases of this 
kind tend to benefit workers in the formal sector of the economy but bring little if any gain to those in the informal 
sector. As president, Widodo will need to find a balance between the demands and interests of the two groups.
Many other social groups have welcomed Widodo’s election. The indications are that women voters were inclined 
to support him19, students and educational organisations tended to do so, and some of Indonesia’s most senior 
journalists expressed a preference for him as president. But few of those groups, taken together, have indicated any 
notable inclination to support the sorts of economic and governance programs that Widodo will need to consider if 
he’s to design a reform program for Indonesia. It will be up to him to persuade these groups that reform, probably 
including some unpopular decisions in the short term, is in their longer term interests.
Foreign policy
Widodo will have little time to review foreign policy issues before three major international meetings appear on his 
agenda. Within three weeks of his appointment, in early November, the 2014 APEC Heads of Government meeting 
will be held in Beijing, followed just a few days later by the East Asia Summit in Naypyitaw and the G20 Heads of 
Government meeting in Brisbane.
The meetings will give Widodo his first entrée to high-level international economic diplomacy. He’ll meet a wide 
range of leaders from around the Pacific rim (in APEC and the East Asia Summit) and from the leading nations of 
the rest of the world (in the G20). However, both he and the policies of the new government in Indonesia will come 
under close attention. The international community will have an opportunity to gain an early first-hand impression 
of the style of the new Indonesian President and of the prospects for Indonesian economic policy under the 
new administration.
Outward-looking statements in two areas would send 
a clear signal that Joko Widodo is inclined to pursue 
internationalist policies as president. 
Outward-looking statements in two areas would send a clear signal that Joko Widodo is inclined to pursue 
internationalist policies as president. First, the main Indonesian statements could emphasise that the new 
government plans to encourage stronger economic growth not by adopting protectionist measures but by 
promoting overall investment, economic openness and structural reform. Second, Widodo could lend Indonesia’s 
support for open regionalism in Asia by emphasising the growing role of ASEAN in regional cooperation programs 
in Southeast Asia. Other key leaders from Southeast Asia will attend the APEC and EAS meetings, but at the 
G20 meeting in Brisbane Widodo will, in effect, be the voice of ASEAN. G20 leaders will therefore listen carefully to 
statements from Indonesia to form judgements about the direction of policy across the ASEAN region.20
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Resilience scenario
There’s no guarantee that it will be easy for a new government in Indonesia to implement organised reform. Just 
as the new government in India under Prime Minister Modi has been criticised recently for failing to move quickly 
to introduce reforms (Mallet 2014), Widodo may find that there’s considerable resistance in some quarters to plans 
for change in Indonesia. Furthermore, since Indonesian independence was declared in 1945, there’s always been 
significant domestic support for nationalist and protectionist policies (Feith & Castles 1970). During the presidential 
campaign, both Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto at various times indicated sympathy for some of those ideas. 
How, then, might policies unfold if reform proves difficult and if nationalist ideas of Indonesian ‘resilience’ take hold 
during the early days of the new administration?
Politics
Widodo might not find it easy to govern. For one thing, the margin of Widodo’s win—he polled around 53% of the 
vote in a two-party contest—was notably less than those recorded by SBY in 2004 and 2009, at around 60%. Yet 
despite clear electoral support, SBY needed to devote a good deal of attention to the politics of governing and often 
found the parliament difficult to deal with. Partly as a result, he was frequently criticised for taking too long to make 
decisions and for being indecisive.
SBY’s supporters hoped that after his second victory in 2009, finally freed from the need to consider the politics 
of re-election, he’d be able to govern more decisively. But soon a difficult political row blew up over controversial 
decisions taken by the central bank, Bank Indonesia, to bail out a troubled commercial bank in 2008. The ‘Bank 
Century’ case, as it became known, was taken up by SBY’s opponents in the parliament, who used it, time and 
again, to nibble away at his authority throughout the whole of his second term. The opposition found many ways 
to frustrate the various proposals that the administration put forward. The debates in 2012 about government 
suggestions to cut back ballooning energy subsidies were particularly heated. In the end, the government was 
forced to withdraw the proposals in a humiliating backdown on a vital issue of economic policy.
Perhaps the main lesson for Widodo from the experience 
of government during SBY’s second term is that the 
president and his team of ministers can expect to face 
frequent criticism, and sometimes outright opposition, in 
the parliament. 
Perhaps the main lesson for Widodo from the experience of government during SBY’s second term is that the 
president and his team of ministers can expect to face frequent criticism, and sometimes outright opposition, in 
the parliament. And Widodo’s early position is made even more difficult because the oppositionist pro-Prabowo 
grouping in the parliament appears to have a clear majority following the legislative election in April 2014. Some 
drift in loyalty can be expected now that Widodo has won the presidency, but a rough count of seats in the new 
parliament in April indicated that the parties supporting him could count on the support of perhaps 210 out of 
560 members (less than 40%), while the opposition group could rely on the votes of the rest. Widodo may need to 
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draw on all of his considerable political and negotiation skills to work with a parliament in which the majority is so 
unsympathetic to his administration.
Sooner rather than later, Joko Widodo will also need to define his relations with the PDI-P, the main party that 
supported him in the presidential election, and with the leader of the PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati (as 
she’s universally known) has dominated the activities of the PDI-P in recent decades. She’s the daughter of the first 
president of Indonesia, Sukarno, and she played a widely honoured role in the political manoeuvres leading up to 
the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Megawati Sukarnoputri’s position in Indonesian public life is such that Widodo will need 
to ensure that he’s seen to respect that position, notwithstanding his own role as president.
The risk in a resilience scenario is that Widodo will find these political hurdles hard to overcome. Many Indonesians 
are hoping for strong leadership from him, but if he faces strong opposition in the parliament, and if he finds it 
difficult to reach a modus vivendi with the PDI-P and Megawati, he may need to appeal increasingly to nationalist and 
populist sentiments to bolster his position. In doing so, he may need to compromise on key aspects of his reform 
program. If so, the risk is that Widodo may begin to be seen as indecisive and ineffective, just as SBY was seen by 
many of his erstwhile supporters in recent years.
Economy
If there are strong pressures on Joko Widodo, including from the parliament, to adopt populist policies, the 
incoming government may find it difficult to promote strong economic growth. In an inward-looking resilience 
scenario in which the government faces resistance to reform measures, the overall rate of economic growth could 
remain relatively low, perhaps below 6% per year. That wouldn’t be sufficient to provide jobs for the expanding 
labour force, and unemployment could be expected to rise. Criticism of Widodo’s leadership would be likely to grow.
The first requirement for a higher rate of growth is a sustained level of investment of over 30% of GDP. But increasing 
nationalism would be likely to discourage foreign investment, particularly in the oil and mining sectors. In turn, 
that would also tend to constrain domestic investment. In that case, the other sectors of the economy could also 
become sluggish before too long.
Investment in the oil and mining sectors has clearly been lagging, and the outgoing SBY administration’s failure 
to deal with the problem more decisively has been puzzling. Oil production has been declining for around two 
decades, and gas production is stagnant. The legal framework to encourage increased investment in the energy 
sector is in urgent need of reform (Machmud 2014). Moreover, the current approach to the minerals sector, which is 
to require mining firms to invest in the domestic processing of ores through the mandatory construction of smelters, 
is clearly discouraging further investment. Without changes in policies, the outlook for the sector isn’t encouraging.
Investment in infrastructure has also been lagging. A package of measures is needed to encourage both 
state-owned enterprises and the private sector to invest in transport, power, water supply, sanitation, 
communications, health and education projects. What’s needed are a clearer framework of overall policy for the 
different parts of the infrastructure sector, more predictable regulatory arrangements, an improved pipeline of 
well-designed projects, and a government commitment to support the introduction of full user-charges to provide 
investors with the financial incentives needed to support new investments.
It’s sufficient to set out this list of problems to show that it will be difficult for the incoming government to introduce 
a package of appropriate reforms to stimulate investment in infrastructure. Resistance to appropriate pricing 
policies, particularly, is strong in the parliament, even though it will be very hard to raise the large amounts of 
revenue needed to support large infrastructure projects without significant price increases. And even if the new 
government is prepared to work hard to introduce worthwhile reforms, it will take at least five years before larger 
projects can be completed and the benefits of the new policies begin to be seen across Indonesia.
A second requirement for higher growth is to ensure that overall demand is sustained across the economy. The 
supply side of the Indonesian economy, especially in the informal economy, is extremely flexible. Sustained demand 
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in Indonesia usually generates strong supply responses, but in the past two years has led to growing imbalances on 
the external account. The authorities have responded partly by allowing the foreign exchange rate to depreciate 
and partly (and more worryingly) by lifting interest rates. Higher interest rates, combined with falling terms of trade, 
have led to a slackening of demand and a slowing of the growth rate.
The authorities would have more room to stimulate demand if the balance-of-payments constraint on growth were 
eased, but current structural policy is tending to choke export growth by discouraging new investment in the energy 
and minerals sectors and by failing to provide incentives for export-oriented manufacturing. In a resilience scenario, 
the risk is that these inward-looking policies will be continued and that relatively little attention will be given to 
policies to promote exports.
A third risk in a resilience scenario is that populist economic policies might exacerbate fiscal pressures on the 
national budget and encourage unions to press for higher wages. Joko Widodo has already indicated that an 
expansion of the national social safety net, through widened health programs, is under consideration. Yet the 
government budget deficit is already very close to the legal limit of 3%. The room for increased spending on 
expensive welfare programs is very limited. Further increases in wages in the formal sector, too, would add to 
pressures on the government budget and exacerbate problems of international competitiveness, especially in the 
manufacturing sector.
The economic options for the incoming administration are quite constrained. A tilt towards nationalist policies 
within a resilience scenario would probably be popular among some business and social groups in Indonesia but 
would hinder growth, job creation and structural change.
Government and administration
Although the new Civil Service Law No. 5 of 2014 opens the way to significant reform of the public service, the scope 
for continued debate and further delay is considerable. Strong political leadership will be needed to implement 
the proposed reforms, especially because there’s likely to be significant resistance within the bureaucracy at the 
provincial and regency levels and in central government agencies.
Recent experience is not encouraging. Proposed reforms outlined in a Law on Public Services introduced by 
the SBY administration and approved by the national parliament in 2009 (after, it might be noted, four years of 
deliberation) aimed ‘to improve the delivery of public services by creating mechanisms for determining minimum 
service standards, receiving and acting on complaints when standards are not met and, in some cases, providing 
compensation’ and attempted ‘to establish clear guidelines on the principles and objectives of public service 
delivery, and a framework for their implementation’ (Buehler 2011). In the event, the law has proved difficult to 
implement. The many problems that have arisen include vagueness in the law, ineffective mechanisms for the 
handling of complaints, weaknesses on the part of legislatures in holding officials to account, and a lack of funding 
for activities specified in the law.
If the Widodo administration wishes to support the implementation of the new Civil Service Law, increased 
funding will be needed to support reforms of administration in the public sector. But the Indonesian public and 
parliaments are usually reluctant to provide more funds for public servants because it’s widely believed that the 
cost of government is already too high. There’s frequent comment in the media about the share of government 
expenditure that’s spent on government administration, especially at the provincial and regency levels. Watchdog 
organisations, such as the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (Seknas Fitra), a public finance think tank, 
are often highly critical of government spending on administration, arguing that public servants frequently misuse 
budgetary allocations.21 While criticisms of this kind aren’t surprising, the fact that social watchdog organisations 
are so antagonistic towards increased government spending will complicate efforts by the Widodo administration to 
promote public sector reform.
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Social issues
The strong support that Joko Widodo received from a wide range of civil society organisations during the 
presidential election campaign has some strings attached. There’s a wide expectation among some activist 
groups that he’ll pursue ‘pro-people welfare programs’ (programs that are pro-kesejahteraan rakyat) and 
appoint ministers who are ‘patriotic … and will promote the national interest’ (para patriotis … serta menjunjung 
kepentingan nasional).22
Some observers downplay such talk as little more than activist rhetoric, but ‘pro-people’ ideas are widely held 
among some groups in Indonesia and Joko Widodo has gone to some lengths to identify himself with a ‘pro-people’ 
approach to policy. At times, he has presented himself as understanding the plight of the ordinary citizen faced 
with the unyielding bureaucracy of government. In one widely reported incident, as Mayor of Surakarta in 2011, he 
became personally involved when the Surakarta municipality had overdue bills of close to $1 million (Rp8.9 billion) 
owing to the state-owned electricity company Perusahaan Listrik Negara. In line with its policy of pursuing a 
more disciplined approach to the collection of overdue bills, the company imposed a blackout on street lamps in 
Surakarta just before Christmas. The municipality quickly authorised payment, but protested that the company 
should have considered the public interest before cutting off the electricity. As a protest, Widodo made a highly 
publicised personal visit to the local Perusahaan Listrik Negara office to pay the Rp8.9 billion in cash, in the form of 
hundreds of bundles of notes and even small coins (Ayuningtyas 2012).
Public delinquency in the payment of bills to government 
agencies is widespread in Indonesia. It’s one of the key 
issues that the incoming government will need to address 
in a program of public sector reform.
While populist gestures of this kind helped to bolster Widodo’s pro-people image, they do little to support the 
improved operation of state-owned enterprises in Indonesia. If, as president, he’s inclined to make such gestures, 
he’s likely to find that such an approach contributes to the fiscal problems of the country. Public delinquency in the 
payment of bills to government agencies is widespread in Indonesia. It’s one of the key issues that the incoming 
government will need to address in a program of public sector reform.
Joko Widodo might also need to consider some broader issues if he decides to continue to emphasise his 
pro-people blusukan approach as president. President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) emphasised a somewhat 
similar pro-people style of public leadership during his relatively brief period as president between 1999 and 2001. 
This aspect of Gus Dur’s attention to public issues was widely appreciated and helped make him a much-loved 
leader of the nation, but was less appreciated among elite politicians, administrators and business leaders. The 
domestic and international media, too, quickly became quite critical of Gus Dur. His former press spokesperson, 
well-known journalist Wimar Witoelar, has spoken of the media ‘lynch mob against a president who represented too 
much uncertainty, especially [for] those who had a stake in the status quo’ (Witoelar 2002:174).
Ultimately, the president of a nation needs to demonstrate strength and the ability to use power effectively. In 
the end, Gus Dur’s highly effective outreach to the orang kecil (the ordinary people, as Wimar Witoelar calls them) 
did little to save him from impeachment by the parliament. One of the lessons for future presidents is that the 
elite in Indonesia holds considerable power. There are risks for any president in trying to bypass the elite through 
direct pro-people appeals for support. A better approach is to balance the presidential relationship with the broad 
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electorate with the management of affairs in dealing with the elite. A president who fails to do this may find, as Gus 
Dur did, that the presidential position can soon become very uncertain.
Foreign policy
A resilient Indonesian foreign policy under a new administration, in contrast to a reform-oriented foreign policy, 
could well be less accommodating to international and regional programs for change. International agendas are 
set out, often in vague terms, in high-level communiqués issued from APEC and G20 meetings and many other 
international meetings held each year. The communiqués are often long and wordy, full of vague language designed 
to disguise sharp differences of interests between the heads of governments at the meetings.
It isn’t surprising that participants from Indonesia are sceptical about the value of such meetings. One of Indonesia’s 
most senior economic policymakers, Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, summarised his experience in representing 
Indonesia at international conferences in the mid-1980s:
There has already been a plethora of global conferences—high-level conferences, ministerial-level conferences, 
and so on—which have set out firm commitments about things like international development cooperation, 
commitments to the need to foster open trading arrangements, and commitments to better manage 
arrangements for multilateral economic cooperation. But unfortunately none of these international economic 
conferences has managed to bring about any significant progress in the area of international economic 
cooperation. And in fact, in all of the North–South forum dialog meetings that have been held, the final results 
have led to dead ends, or efforts that have just faded away, or even a weakening of earlier commitments that had 
been entered into. (Widjojo 2010:539)
Reading briefings like this, President Joko Widodo may well conclude that he shouldn’t invest too much effort into 
the international game of meetings of heads of governments.
A nationalist Indonesian approach to foreign policy, therefore, would be cautious about making commitments to 
participate in ambitious international or regional programs. Rather, Indonesia would focus on a limited number of 
key goals. Those might include, first, strengthening regional security in Southeast Asia, and second, supporting the 
measured expansion of ASEAN-related programs in the region.
The disadvantage of a cautious approach of this kind is that some international observers might suggest, as in 
the past, that Indonesia is punching below its weight in international affairs. And unless Indonesia provided a firm 
commitment to continue to play a strong regional role, programs designed to expand ASEAN might be held back. 
However, the nationalist response within Indonesia would be that the first priority for Indonesia should be to build 
strength and resilience at home. Many Indonesians would say that Indonesia can only hope to provide leadership 
across ASEAN once the country has a strong economy and has strong government institutions that engender 
confidence both at home and abroad.
Some implications
What’s the outlook for Australia–Indonesia relations—and Australia’s relations with ASEAN—in Joko Widodo’s 
Indonesia? Much depends on the broad policy direction—reform or resilience—that Indonesia pursues during the 
next few years. However, whichever direction is taken, there are likely to elements of both change and continuity in 
the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Change can be expected because considerable jockeying for influence is likely to occur during the coming months as 
Widodo and his team settle into office. The president’s own views will be important, of course, but he doesn’t have 
extensive experience in foreign affairs. The push and pull of interest and advocacy groups, the views of senior policy 
advisers and perhaps pressures from the parliament may have a significant influence on the direction of policy. 
There’s likely to be considerable competition for the ear of the president.
Continuities in policy can also be expected. For one thing, foreign policy isn’t a strongly contested area of public 
policy debate in Indonesia. In recent decades, Indonesian presidents have tended to rely on the advice of seasoned 
advisers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who’ve been careful to adhere to long-established principles: 
firm adherence to a ‘free and active’ foreign policy; strong support for ASEAN regionalism in Southeast Asia; a 
tendency to rely on regional and multilateral approaches rather than bilateral action when possible; and caution in 
responding to the various blandishments sometimes offered to Indonesia by nations such as the US and China and 
regional groupings such as the European Union.
Also, despite recent uncertainties in the Australia–Indonesia relationship, Indonesian commentators and 
policymakers are inclined to see Australia’s activities in Southeast Asia as benign rather than malign. Certainly, 
Australia is seen as having the capacity to act somewhat unilaterally, sometimes at short notice, and to be less 
committed to regional consultations with neighbours than is the custom, for example, between the members of 
ASEAN. And Indonesian policymakers are aware that the potential for friction between Indonesia and Australia over 
problems in the Papuan provinces is considerable. As recently as 2006, the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia 
was recalled to Jakarta for several months following the Australian Government’s decision to grant temporary 
protection visas to asylum seekers from West Papua. Australia, therefore, is seen by many observers in Indonesia as 
generally having well-meaning intentions but sometimes stumbling along the way.
CHAPTER 4
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Reform scenario
If Joko Widodo and his government are able to pursue an effective reform scenario, Australia and Indonesia 
should find it easy to find common ground for cooperation. Widodo has set goals of fostering democratic norms, 
strengthening domestic stability and civil society, and promoting economic growth. It’s in Australia’s interests that 
he succeeds in promoting those reforms and others that he has spoken of. It’s also in Australia’s interests, as well as 
the broader interests of ASEAN, that Widodo provides effective leadership within ASEAN.
To provide tangible support for a reform agenda in Indonesia, the Australian Government could look to expand 
programs of bilateral cooperation, with the agreement of the Indonesian Government, in several ways:
• Support government reform. There’s wide agreement within Indonesia that public sector reform is a priority. 
Australia could lend useful support in this area. In recent years, there have been effective twinning programs 
between Australian and Indonesian government departments in such areas as finance, treasury, immigration, 
defence, statistics and auditing, among others. Arrangements of this kind provide links that are in the interests 
of both countries. Links in the defence sector have been especially important in recent decades. There’s wide 
scope to expand twinning into other areas, such as infrastructure management, health and education planning, 
and environmental policy. On the Australian side, it would be helpful to strengthen incentives for Australian 
agencies to further develop these types of bilateral programs.
• Strengthen cooperation with Indonesia at the international level. In recent years, Australia and Indonesia have 
identified shared interests in areas of international affairs such as maritime cooperation, quarantine, health 
and regional security. Differences in priorities remain, but two voices are better than one. When Canberra and 
Jakarta can work together to support regional and international programs, the joint priorities of Australia and 
Southeast Asia are more likely to be recognised across the international community. Australia and Indonesia 
have cooperated effectively in APEC for well over two decades. And, although Australia isn’t a member of ASEAN, 
it has a strong interest in ASEAN’s continuing success. More recently, Australia and Indonesia have been working 
to improve cooperation between leaders within the G20 framework. In all of these areas, it’s in the interests of 
both countries to work together to promote shared goals. Australia should look to opportunities to work with 
Indonesia to strengthen joint programs in these and other international organisations.
• Build private sector and people-to-people links. It’s in the interests of both countries to strengthen a wide range of 
non-government links between the two. Business and trade connections remain surprisingly underdeveloped, 
considering that in many areas the two economies are complementary rather than competitive. Joko Widodo 
has emphasised the importance of these sectors in Indonesia, and he comes to office with strong personal 
experience in the private sector. On the Australian side, it would be helpful to consider what further steps might 
be taken in Australia to promote links between the two countries in these areas. There are various regulatory and 
other impediments in Australia that discourage such links. As just one example, many parts of the service sector 
in Australia are inward-looking and not inclined to venture into markets in developing countries in Asia, such as 
Indonesia, despite rapid growth in the demand for services in Asia. The Australian tertiary education sector was 
able to expand the provision of education services into Asian markets in the 1990s, but only after pro-market 
reforms were introduced into the sector in the mid-1980s. It would be useful to review similar barriers in other 
sectors, with the aim of facilitating private sector and community links between the two countries.23
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Resilience scenario
If the broad direction of Indonesian policy moves towards a resilience scenario, Australia should nevertheless aim 
to maintain strong and effective relations with Indonesia. It’s for the Indonesian people and their leaders to decide 
which policies are in the best interests of their nation. Many of the social problems and issues of governance in 
Indonesia are daunting ones, and it would be in the best interests of both countries for Australia to continue to 
strengthen programs of cooperation with Indonesia. Appropriate approaches might include the following:
• Work harder to understand Indonesia’s challenges. The two countries are very different. Australia’s a rich country 
with strong cultural and policy links with Western nations of the North, particularly the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Indonesia’s the third-largest developing country, with important links to other nations of the South, including in 
the Moslem world. The domestic priorities in each country are also very different. Against this background, it’s 
in Australia’s interests for senior policymakers in Canberra and other observers to have a sound appreciation of 
the domestic challenges in Indonesia. In recent years, Australian policy towards Indonesia has sometimes been 
changeable and directed towards the achievement of particular short-term goals. But Australia and Indonesia 
will be neighbours forever. Australia’s best interests will be best served if Australian decisions are taken with an 
eye to the long term in working with Indonesia on issues of joint interest.
• Continue to build links. If a stronger nationalist mood emerges within Indonesia during the next few years, it 
may become more difficult to further strengthen government and other links between the two countries, at 
least in the short term. Nevertheless, consistent with a policy approach in which Australia looks to the longer 
term, it would still be in the interests of both countries, as well as the broader interests of the region, for 
Australia to develop government-to-government twinning links where possible and to promote a range of other 
people-to-people links. Links between the Australian and Indonesian defence forces have served both countries 
well for over 50 years and should continue to be strengthened. Opportunities should be taken to strengthen 
links in many other areas.
• Scholarship programs. Many thousands of Indonesian students have studied in Australia in recent decades, 
both in programs supported by scholarships supported by Australian aid and as private students in courses in 
Australia. Some of Indonesia’s most senior public servants and cabinet ministers have studied in Australia and 
speak warmly of their experiences in undergraduate and graduate courses here. It’s in the long-term interests 
of both countries to strengthen bonds developed through programs of this kind. Even if a stronger nationalist 
mood is evident in Indonesia under the incoming government, the scope for an expanded scholarship program 
would be considerable.
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Conclusion
After a largely peaceful and progressive 10 years of administration under the leadership of Indonesia’s sixth 
president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s institutions have grown stronger and its international 
standing has risen, but the challenges ahead remain daunting. Many aspects of governance across the nation are 
underdeveloped. Despite good economic progress, close to half of the population live on incomes of below $2 per 
day. And prospects for the continued strengthening of regional cooperation through ASEAN depend to a large 
degree on active support from the Indonesian President.
Indonesia’s seventh president, Joko Widodo, will need to decide whether to adopt an outward-looking reform 
program or to pursue a more inward-looking approach intended to promote resilience at home. The reform path 
would be harder to implement in the short term, but promises stronger economic growth and development in the 
medium term. The resilience path would quite probably be more popular with some influential groups in Indonesia 
and would reflect the direction of policy in some key areas of governance in recent years.
Perhaps Indonesia’s new president will, depending on circumstances, select policies that combine elements from 
both the reform and the resilience paths, but much depends on the emphasis he’s able to give to the reform path. 
The resilience path perhaps offers safer political options but would delay many of the reforms in government, 
economics and social affairs that are still urgently needed to strengthen Indonesia’s place in the world.
1 These events are discussed in colourful detail by a well-known Indonesian journalist and former presidential 
spokesman for president Abdurrahman Wahid in Witoelar (2002).
2 It is useful to recall the concerns held in some circles in the international community when SBY came to office. 
The Economist summarised some key changes during SBY’s first term as follows: ‘When he won the presidency in 
2004, Mr Yudhoyono took over a country dealing with Islamic terrorism, separatist violence, a fragile democratic 
record and a military still very much involved in political and economic life. Five years on, these problems have 
largely faded into the background.’ Economist Intelligence Unit, 21 April 2009.
3 A very useful overall review of developments in the legal system from the Dutch colonial period to the end of the 
Soeharto era is in Lev (2000).
4 A much-discussed example of the intermingling of influential political and business activities at the provincial 
level in recent years is in the province of Banten, close to Jakarta. The high-profile Governor of Bantan, Ms 
Ratu Atut, participated in the establishment of a so-called ‘political dynasty’ in the province. Ratu Atut was 
investigated by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission in 2013. In 2014, she was formally detained 
by the commission on charges of corruption. Details are in the Wikipedia entry for Ratu Atut Chosiyah (https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratu_Atut_Chosiyah).
5 Quarterly surveys of the Indonesian economy issued by the World Bank are on the World Bank Indonesia website 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia).
6 For example, ACDGI (2013) talks of annual rates of growth of 7% and even higher. In addition, President-elect 
Joko Widodo has said that he sees a level of 7% as a desirable growth target for Indonesia. 
7 Many countries maintain deficits on the current account for quite long periods. Australia, which is usually 
a capital-importing country, has run a deficit of around 3% of GDP on the current account for much of the 
past century.
8 As just one example, the planning agency, Bappenas, issued detailed guidelines of over 300 pages to staff in 
Bappenas (2009).
9  A summary of some of the challenges facing the legal system in Indonesia is on the Wikipedia for the Indonesian 
Supreme Court (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_Indonesia). 
10 See ‘Judges strive to uphold dignity despite low pay’, Jakarta Post, 26 April 2012, www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2012/04/26/judges-strive-uphold-dignity-despite-low-pay.html. This article includes a listing of official 
salaries at the time. 
11 The 2013 US Human Rights Report is at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/. Comments relating to Indonesia are at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220408.pdf.
12 Myrdal’s (1968) key distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ states is relevant in this context.
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13 As an example, during 2013 there was a protracted conflict in Sampang district on the island of Madura, near 
Surabaya, involving a local Shia community. The ongoing issue attracted much attention in the national press. 
Leading members of the majority Sunni community in Sampang regarded some of the activities of the Shia 
community as unacceptable. Some of the Shia community were ejected from Sampang and were forced to move 
to the Sidoarjo district near Surabaya. 
14 Woolcock (2007) discussed the choices between different types of diplomacy (bilateral, regional, plurilateral, 
and multilateral.
15 Information on the Bali Process is available at www.baliprocess.net/.
16 Prominent Indonesian economist and former minister, Professor Moh. Sadli, used to argue that Indonesian 
policymakers are generally pragmatic and are skilled at ‘muddling through’ when problems crop up.
17 Henry IV, Act 5, Scene 5, line 47, ‘I know thee not, old man. Fall to thy prayers.’
18 A summary of steps towards an ASEAN Economic Community is in ADBI (2010); see also the ASEAN website 
(www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community).
19 See comments by Julia Suryakusuma, a well-known writer on women’s affairs in Indonesia, in ‘View Point: 
‘Cherchez la femme’, Jokowi’s “feminine” leadership’, Jakarta Post, 6 August 2014, www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2014/08/06/view-point-cherchez-la-femme-jokowi-s-feminine-leadership.html.
20 Issues affecting Asian regionalism and the prospects for an Asian economic community are discussed in 
Capanelli & kawai (2014).
21 See the Seknas Fitra website (http://seknasfitra.org/?lang=en).
22 ‘kabinet Perekonomian Jokowi-Jk Harus Pro kesejahteraan Rakyat’ [The Jokowi-Jk Economic Cabinet must be 
Pro-Peoples’ Welfare], reporting on a conference held on 7 July 2014, http://seknasfitra.org/fitra-kabinet-pereko
nomian-jokowi-jk-harus-pro-kesejahteraan-rakyat/.
23 For details of cooperation of this kind between Indonesian and Australian police forces, see Connery et. al.
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